

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----045466 250520Z /12
O 250400Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4236

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 7596

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, IR, US
SUBJ: AWACS ASSURANCES

REF: STATE 199924

1. LTG FISH HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL TOUFANIAN AND LTG RABII (COMMANDER, IIAF) ON SUBJECT AUGUST 24, WHICH ALSO COVERED ELEMENTS IN HUMPHREY/ CASE AUGUST 5 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. NEITHER TOUFANIAN NOR RABII FOUND PROPOSED ASSURANCES TROUBLE-SOME SINCE THEY VIEWED THEM AS REFLECTING POINTS TO WHICH GOI ALREADY COMMITTED UNDER, FOR EXAMPLE, FMS ARRANGEMENTS WITH USG. TOUFANIAN STATED GOI AGREE-MENT IN PRINCIPLE TO ASSURANCES NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE WRITTEN REPORT TO THE SHAH.
 2. FISH OPENED DISCUSSION WITH BOTH BY STATING CATEGORIC COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT AND ENTIRE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO AWACS SALE TO IRAN. TOUFANIAN AND RABII EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THIS AFFIRMATION, NOTING SINGULAR IMPOR-TANCE OF SUCCESSFUL CONSUMMATION OF AWACS SALE TO DEVELOPMENT
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OF A CAPABLE AND CREDIBLE DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO THREAT IRAN FACES IN THIS INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE REGION. IN THAT REGARD RABII NOTED THAT IRAN THREATENED BY FAR MORE THAN IRAQ; 360 DEGREE DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS REQUIRED, AND THIS GREATLY COMPLICATED BY SIZE OF IRAN (AS COMPARED TO WEST GERMANY, OR EVEN WESTERN EUROPE) AND ITS EXTREMELY RUGGED AND MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.

3. BOTH TOUFANIAN AND RABII MADE STRONG CASE FOR EXCELLENT QUALITY OF IRANIAN SECURITY, POINTING OUT THAT GOI HAS NEVER HAD SECURITY COMPROMISE. BOTH AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY TO "SECURITY PRECAUTIONS" ASSURANCES, WITH TOUFANIAN REMINDING FISH THAT GOI MILITARY MADE PRACTICE OF ASKING US IF ANY SHORTCOMINGS PERCEIVED WITH IRANIAN SECURITY, AND FOR ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE MOST MODERN PROCEDURES AND SECURITY PRACTICES.

4. TOUFA POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF THE REASONS IRAN PROPOSED TO BUY AWACS IS TO UNDERSCORE ITS DEFENSIVE INTENTIONS, SINCE AWACS WILL PERMIT GOI TO MOUNT CAPABLE AIR DEFENSE FURTHER INLAND THAN LESSER CAPABLE AIRBORNE PLATFORMS OR, CERTAINLY, ALL GROUND RADAR SYSTEM. TOUFANIAN WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT GOI HAD LIMITED, OUTMODED GROUND RADAR SYSTEM WHICH ENTIRELY INCAPABLE AGAINST MODERN, LOW ATTACK TACTIC. THAT TACTIC, IN CONJUNCTION WITH IRANIAN TERRAIN, MADE AIRBORNE/ GROUND RADAR COMBINATION ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE.

5. WHEN ASKED ABOUT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO AWACS TOUFANIAN MADE CLEAR THERE WERE NONE. HE REVIEWED SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN HE HAD BEEN FULLY BRIEFED, AND LATER BRIEFED THE SHAH, ON E-2C HAWKEYE ALONG LINES REPORTED TEHRAN 5966 (DTG 070414Z JUL 77). GOI ASSESSMENT CONCLUDED THAT E-2C DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH CLUTTER AND DUCTING PROBLEMS IN IRAN. TOUFANIAN SAID GOI WOULD NEVER PURCHASE HAWKEYE.

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6. TOUFANIAN SAID THAT GOI HAD BEEN LOOKING INTO UK NIMROD AS A POSSIBLE AWACS ALTERNATIVE, BUT ALSO FOUND IT SIGNIFICANTLY WANTING. FOR EXAMPLE, NIMROD LOOKDOWN CAPABILITY JUST NOT ADEQUATE TO IRANIAN NEEDS. IN ORDER TO HAVE NIMROD WITH ADEQUATE CAPABILITY GOI CONCLUDED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR IRAN TO ASSIST UK WITH ADDITIONAL NIMROD R&D UNTIL 1982 OR 1983, OR PERHAPS LONGER. AND, OF COURSE, SUCH AN EFFORT MIGHT NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN PROVIDING IRAN WITH ENOUGH CAPABILITY TO DO THE JOB. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ALSO REQUIRE GREATER IRANIAN RESOURCES THEN WOULD AWACS ALTERNATIVE. TOUFANIAN ADMITTED THAT IRAN MIGHT BE FORCED TO THIS IF US COULD NOT SELL AWACS. HE FOUND THIS CURIOUS, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF LIMITED GOI RESOURCES AND SKEPTICISM ON PART OF SOME ABOUT IRAN'S ABSORPTION CAPABILITY. WITH RESPECT TO BOTH RESOURCES AND ABSORPTION IRAN WOULD HAVE EASIER TIME WITH AWACS TOUFANIAN CONCLUDED.

7. ON QUESTIONS OF US PERSONNEL NUMBERS AND US PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONAL MISSIONS, BOTH TOUFANIAN AND RABII EMPHASIZED THAT IRAN WANTED MINIMUM NUMBER OF US PERSONNEL POSSIBLE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST, AS GOI HAD ALWAYS DONE, THAT NO US PERSONNEL PARTICIPATE IN IRANIAN OPERATIONAL MISSIONS. TOUFANIAN STATED FLATLY THAT IRAN HAD NO WISH TO TRAIN CADRE ELSEWHERE

THAN IN THE US, SINCE IRAN DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE TRAINING FACILITIES AND US TRAINING THEREFORE MARKEDLY CHEAPER.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 7596

EXDIS

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8. WITH RESPECT TO QUESTION OF MULTIPLIER EFFECT, RABII SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DEFEND IRAN WITH FEWEST NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT POSSIBLE, BUT IN VIEW OF THREATS WITH WHICH IRAN CONFRONTED IIAF REQUIRED A BASIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. EVEN AWACS COULD NOT CHANGE THAT. INDEED, PRINCIPAL IMPACT OF AWACS MULTIPLIER EFFECT IS DEFENSIVE, PERMITTING EXISTING AIRCRAFT TO ESCAPE DESTRUCTION BECAUSE OF GREATER WARNING CAPABILITY.

9. TOUFANIAN AND RABII EXPRESSED THANKS FOR FISH VISIT, WHICH PROVIDED MOST USEFUL OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 7 RESUBMISSION TO CONGRESS TO DISCUSS AWACS SALE AND SHARED USG/GOI APPROACH TO IT. TOUFANIAN AND RABII ALSO STATED THAT EXPRESSION OF PRESIDENT'S FULL SUPPORT CONVEYED BY FISH WAS REASSURING CONFIRMATION THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CONSIDERED OF SINGULAR AND SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO US. TOUFANIAN SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO SHAH IMMEDIATELY UPON LATTER'S RETURN FROM CURRENT EAST EUROPEAN TRIP NEXT WEEK.
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